Special thanks to Alexander G. Hopkins for coauthoring this article.
Subcontractor employee bodily injury claims (so-called action over claims) are a staple of construction risk management in the Empire State—so much so that the phrase "labor law" instinctively invites a shudder among the most experienced general contractors. The savvy among them intensely monitor case law developments and the evolution of the insurance market to ensure a cutting-edge, meticulously developed downstream risk transfer plan. And when guidance arrives from an appellate-level court, it's a moment to take note.
This is one of those moments.
In late 2025, New York's highest court—the NY Court of Appeals—had the rare opportunity to examine an all-too-routine bodily injury fact pattern and took the opportunity to closely examine the scope of contractual indemnity and its interplay with additional insured coverage in Dibrino v. Rockefeller Center N., Inc.,
2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 07077, 2025 WL 3670593 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2025).
Facts of the Case
A carpenter employed by a drywall subcontractor ("Sub A") was injured after falling from a defective ladder owned by an electrical subcontractor ("Sub B"). The ladder had been left unattended by Sub B but marked with blue tape (meant to indicate it was out of service). The Sub A carpenter used the ladder without permission.
The Sub A carpenter sued the general contractor (GC) and owner for his injuries. The GC and owner had contractual indemnity rights from Sub B (the owner of the ladder) for any liability "arising out of" Sub B's scope of work. The GC and owner tendered a claim for contractual indemnity to Sub B.
Sub B rejected the tender, arguing that the injuries did not meet the "arising out of" standard. The GC and owner sued Sub B, and the question eventually wound its way to the NY Court of Appeals.
Court's Ruling
The majority opinion1 held that, under these facts, Sub B did not owe defense or indemnity to the GC and owner. The court reasoned that the master subcontract's indemnity provisions were not triggered because the connection between the contractually defined "work" and the injury—arising from the unauthorized use of Sub B's ladder—was too attenuated to fall within the indemnity scope. Said one way, mere ownership of the ladder was not enough.2
Here's a breakdown of the essential commentary.
Scope of "work" matters. Indemnity provisions tied to "performance of the work" require a direct nexus between the claim and the subcontractor's defined scope of work. The unauthorized use of Sub B's ladder, the court decided, fell outside that scope.
"Arising out of" has limits. Courts will not expand indemnity obligations beyond what the parties clearly intended. Broad phrases like "arising out of" are limited by contractual definitions. Even broad wording cannot be read to untether indemnity from the subcontract's defined "work"/"under this Agreement" limitations; the court rejected a reading that would make indemnity turn on any traceable "path" back to Sub B.
No tort duty assumed. Sub B's failure to remove the ladder did not create a duty of care to third parties under the "instrument of harm" exception. Leaving a ladder unattended was deemed a negligent omission, not an active "commission of a wrong."
Important Commentary for Additional Insureds
The court noted a line of additional insured cases broadly interpreting "arising out of" and rejected reliance on them to expand contractual indemnity in this case, emphasizing that insurance‑context interpretive rules (including construing ambiguity in favor of coverage) do not apply to indemnification agreements between contractors. Consequently, the historically broad interpretation of "arising out of" in additional insured cases is unaffected by this decision.
To wit, New York courts have interpreted "arising out of" broadly in the insurance context, often requiring only a minimal causal connection between the injury and the risk insured. For example, consider the following cases.
Worth Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
10 N.Y.3d 411, 415 (2008). The court held that "arising out of" means "originating from, incident to, or having connection with" and does not require proximate cause.
Maroney v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
5 N.Y.3d 467, 472 (2005). Reinforced that "arising out of" requires only some causal relationship, not direct causation.
However, in Dibrino, the court emphasized that these insurance principles do not apply to indemnity clauses in construction contracts. Unlike insurance policies, indemnity provisions are strictly construed to avoid imposing obligations beyond the parties' intent. The court rejected the expansive reading urged by the general contractor and owner, noting that the contract's definition of "work" and its scope limitations controlled the outcome.
Table 1. Insurance Versus Contractual Indemnity: Key Interpretive Differences from the Court's Ruling
Aspect
Insurance Policies
Contractual Indemnity Clauses
Interpretation standard
Broad: Ambiguity resolved in favor of coverage.
Narrow: Ambiguity resolved against imposing additional obligations.
"Arising out of" meaning
Requires only a minimal causal connection (e.g., "originating from, incident to").
Requires a direct nexus to the defined scope of work or performance duties.
Proximate cause required?
No: Mere connection suffices.
Yes: Must relate to the subcontractor's actual work or contractual obligations; attenuated connections are insufficient.
Policy objective
Protect insured against risk; courts favor coverage.
Limit liability to what parties expressly agreed upon.
Key cases
Worth Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
10 N.Y.3d 411, 415 (2008); Maroney v. NY Cent. Mut.,
5 N.Y.3d 467, 472 (2005)
Dibrino v. Rockefeller Center N., Inc.,
2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 07077; 2025 WL 3670593 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2025)
Key Takeaways and Considerations Based on the Court's Analysis
Know the name Dibrino. This decision will undoubtedly be at the forefront of any downstream risk transfer exercise going forward. Those looking to pass risk will need to navigate its nuances; those looking to defer risk transfer will see it as reinforcing the importance of tightly defined work scopes and disciplined contract drafting.
Audit indemnity clauses. Ensure contracts clearly define "work" as it relates to indemnity obligations, and avoid vague language that could lead to disputes.
Coordinate with insurance. Understand that indemnity obligations and insurance coverage operate under different interpretive rules, and do not assume broad insurance interpretations will apply to contracts.
Plan for litigation risk. Narrow indemnity language may limit recovery options, and consider negotiating broader indemnity or supplemental insurance where exposure is high.
Opinions expressed in Expert Commentary articles are those of the author and are not necessarily held by the author's employer or IRMI. Expert Commentary articles and other IRMI Online content do not purport to provide legal, accounting, or other professional advice or opinion. If such advice is needed, consult with your attorney, accountant, or other qualified adviser.
2 The dissent disagreed that the fact pattern was this simple. From their perspective, Sub B did more than just own the ladder; it left the ladder unsupervised during the course of its contracted‑for work. The dissent would have enforced the master subcontractor addendum's broader language to require indemnity on these facts.
Special thanks to Alexander G. Hopkins for coauthoring this article.
Subcontractor employee bodily injury claims (so-called action over claims) are a staple of construction risk management in the Empire State—so much so that the phrase "labor law" instinctively invites a shudder among the most experienced general contractors. The savvy among them intensely monitor case law developments and the evolution of the insurance market to ensure a cutting-edge, meticulously developed downstream risk transfer plan. And when guidance arrives from an appellate-level court, it's a moment to take note.
This is one of those moments.
In late 2025, New York's highest court—the NY Court of Appeals—had the rare opportunity to examine an all-too-routine bodily injury fact pattern and took the opportunity to closely examine the scope of contractual indemnity and its interplay with additional insured coverage in Dibrino v. Rockefeller Center N., Inc., 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 07077, 2025 WL 3670593 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2025).
Facts of the Case
A carpenter employed by a drywall subcontractor ("Sub A") was injured after falling from a defective ladder owned by an electrical subcontractor ("Sub B"). The ladder had been left unattended by Sub B but marked with blue tape (meant to indicate it was out of service). The Sub A carpenter used the ladder without permission.
The Sub A carpenter sued the general contractor (GC) and owner for his injuries. The GC and owner had contractual indemnity rights from Sub B (the owner of the ladder) for any liability "arising out of" Sub B's scope of work. The GC and owner tendered a claim for contractual indemnity to Sub B.
Sub B rejected the tender, arguing that the injuries did not meet the "arising out of" standard. The GC and owner sued Sub B, and the question eventually wound its way to the NY Court of Appeals.
Court's Ruling
The majority opinion 1 held that, under these facts, Sub B did not owe defense or indemnity to the GC and owner. The court reasoned that the master subcontract's indemnity provisions were not triggered because the connection between the contractually defined "work" and the injury—arising from the unauthorized use of Sub B's ladder—was too attenuated to fall within the indemnity scope. Said one way, mere ownership of the ladder was not enough. 2
Here's a breakdown of the essential commentary.
Important Commentary for Additional Insureds
The court noted a line of additional insured cases broadly interpreting "arising out of" and rejected reliance on them to expand contractual indemnity in this case, emphasizing that insurance‑context interpretive rules (including construing ambiguity in favor of coverage) do not apply to indemnification agreements between contractors. Consequently, the historically broad interpretation of "arising out of" in additional insured cases is unaffected by this decision.
To wit, New York courts have interpreted "arising out of" broadly in the insurance context, often requiring only a minimal causal connection between the injury and the risk insured. For example, consider the following cases.
However, in Dibrino, the court emphasized that these insurance principles do not apply to indemnity clauses in construction contracts. Unlike insurance policies, indemnity provisions are strictly construed to avoid imposing obligations beyond the parties' intent. The court rejected the expansive reading urged by the general contractor and owner, noting that the contract's definition of "work" and its scope limitations controlled the outcome.
Key Takeaways and Considerations Based on the Court's Analysis
Opinions expressed in Expert Commentary articles are those of the author and are not necessarily held by the author's employer or IRMI. Expert Commentary articles and other IRMI Online content do not purport to provide legal, accounting, or other professional advice or opinion. If such advice is needed, consult with your attorney, accountant, or other qualified adviser.