Fraud and Abuse or Abuse of Fraud: Do Insurance Antifraud Laws
Tip the Scales against Insureds?*
February 2009
Repeated attempts to make fraud
against insurance companies a crime gained significant traction
among regulators and legislators over the last 2 decades; consequently,
according to the Insurance Information Institute, all 50 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes defining insurance
fraud as a crime. The National Association of Insurance Commissioner's
(NAIC's) latest list of states adopting its Insurance Fraud Prevention
Model Act (IFPMA) or some variation thereof is 48.1
by
Tim Ryles, Ph.D.
Tim
Ryles Consulting
Typically, fraud statutes establish the following framework:
- a definition of "fraudulent insurance act";
- delegation of power to a state agency, usually
the insurance regulatory official;
- creation of a special fraud division within
the administering agency;
- a requirement that insurers report instances
of fraud to the administering agency;
- a grant of immunity to persons who report insurance
fraud; and
- a requirement that insurers adopt "antifraud
initiatives reasonably calculated to detect, prosecute,
and prevent fraudulent insurance acts."
Typically, insurers form their own Special Investigative Unit
(SIU) or contract with outside entities to implement this latter
provision.
To discourage applicants for insurance and persons who file claims
from fraudulent acts, Section 3 of the NAIC Model requires the following
warning:
Any person who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent
claim for payment of a loss or benefit or knowingly
presents false information in an application for
insurance is guilty of a crime and may be subject
to fines and confinement in prison.
There is no corresponding fraud warning to insurers who submit
official documents to regulators or insureds, including submissions
of suspected fraudulent activity, insurer estimates of loss, or
insurer misrepresentations to policyholders about coverage.
The widespread enactment of fraud laws is a remarkable public
policy success story. Similarly, while no one can necessarily point
to an exact figure as to how costly insurance fraud is, one thing
is readily observable: fighting fraud, measured by organizational
growth and sheer numbers of persons engaged in fraud investigations,
is a growth industry.2
What seems to have fallen under the radar screen, however, are
questions about the impact of antifraud activities on the insurer-insured
relationship and the regulatory process itself. Does the new antifraud
apparatus tip the scales of fairness against policyholders who submit
claims? Have insurance regulators made a smooth transition from
an exclusively civil regulatory function to that of a criminal investigative
agency? Given the close relationship between insurers and regulators,
are insurance regulators capable of exercising independent judgment
in enforcing criminal laws against fraud? I will examine these issues
in this and future commentaries.
The Insurance Contract and the Claims Process
An insurance contract is not just another contract on par with
sales contracts in used car purchases and rules governing insurance
are not rooted in caveat emptor;
rather, an insurance policy is a contract of utmost good faith.
As the Arizona Supreme Court opined, "An insurance contract is not
an ordinary commercial bargain; implicit in the contract and the
relationship is the insurer's obligation to play fairly with its
insured."3
One reason that fair play is so vital is because an insurance
policy is also a contract of adhesion. Insurance companies write
the policy, and policyholders must "adhere" to its terms when purchasing
insurance. Under the policy, the insurer may, at its discretion,
demand that an insured comply with the following requirements when
filing claims:
- Provide timely notice of a claim
- Submit a satisfactory proof of loss
- Grant formal recorded statements pertaining
to the loss
- Submit to examinations under oath as often as
the insurer demands
- Cooperate with the insurer
- Satisfy all conditions of the policy
The insured, on the other hand, has no contractual right to require
that an adjuster submit sworn statements about how she evaluates
the loss or to require claims personnel to submit to examinations
under oath. The fact that the insurance company holds the money
and is engaging in something it does every day (claims adjusting),
whereas, the insured is a novice, further adds to the imbalance.
Through an appraisal clause, an insurance policy implicitly recognizes
claims handling as an inexact undertaking by including a means of
resolving disputes over value. Appraisal clauses suggest that claims
outcomes are usually negotiated between the parties, a view reinforced
by claims vocabulary. Claims are "adjusted" from "estimates": consistent
with this view, modern adjuster training includes subjects covering
negotiation, bargaining, communications, including nonverbal communications,
and other social science related disciplines.4
Thus, it is common to use the expression "estimate" in describing
loss amounts. No matter whose "estimate" is at issue, no one should
view the numbers as anything but just that; additionally, in comparing
insured and policyholder estimates, it is common for the two numbers
to be far apart. To illustrate using a case in which I served as
expert, the insurer's estimate was $0.0; the policyholder's was
over $105,000. When the insured invoked the appraisal clause, an
award of $15,730.00 resulted. Statistically, the award represented
15,730 times the company's estimate and 6.7 times the policyholder's
estimate.
Enter the Fraud Statutes into the Claims Process
Traditionally, insurer-insured disputes are resolved through
civil laws and procedures, but with the advent of fraud statutes,
criminal laws are part of the regulatory equation. According to
the NAIC's IFPMA, "fraudulent insurance act" means:
an act or omission committed by a person who, knowingly
and [emphasis italics] with intent to defraud, commits,
or conceals any material information concerning
one or more of the following….
A laundry list of offenses follows the definition. In rules of
contract construction, this is a limiting definition. Further, I
have emphasized "and" to indicate that both knowledge and intent
to defraud must occur.
Now, suppose an adjuster wants to gain advantage by bending the
law. Here is an example of what I have observed. The appraisal clause
may be a means of resolving disputes over loss amount but no similar
provision allows a means of settling disputes over coverage. From
an insurer's perspective, appraisal may result in a loss of control
over the claim and increase the probability that an insured will
gain a better outcome. Thus, to evade appraisal, an adjuster may
contend that there is no evidence of loss despite evidence to the
contrary, thereby precluding use of the appraisal clause and changing
the character of the dispute in such a way that a fraud accusation
against a policyholder appears more defensible. Accusing a person
of fraud for claiming loss when an insurer asserts that there is
no loss may have a chilling effect on an insured's enthusiasm for
pursuing the claim, even when there is no fraudulent intent.
The contractual tools available to the insurer to discover voluminous
details about a claimant's alleged loss further enhance an insurer's
ability to abuse its fraud powers. To illustrate further, concealment
of material facts is a common allegation against policyholders.
Through sworn statements, examinations under oath and other contractual
provisions an adjuster may pursue concerns about concealment, whether
real or manufactured, and impose heavy burdens on an insured, including
possible conviction for fraud.
The adjuster's expanded discretion to employ fraud statutes in
claim negotiation assumes even greater salience when attention focuses
on possible adjuster concealment. For example, what if the adjuster
in a property loss uses a computer program to estimate personal
and real property damages but fails to disclose this fact? Further,
what if a natural catastrophe (a hurricane, for example) has significantly
increased costs of labor and materials but the insurer has not updated
its computerized database to take into account the increase and
does not reveal this fact to the insured? Under this scenario, an
insurer may force the insured to bargain blindly and accept underpayment;
however, since the insured has no means short of filing a lawsuit
to prove insurer concealment, the insurer deception may go undetected.
Thus, over-reporting by an insured may invite an accusation of fraud
while underpayment by an insurer is subject to far less likelihood
of discovery and punishment. This conduct shreds the principle of
utmost good faith.
Perhaps an even greater potential for mischief is the "Mandatory
Reporting of Fraudulent Insurance Acts" of Section 6 and the Immunity
from Liability, Section 7, of the NAIC Model. Section 6 states:
A. A person engaged in the business of insurance
having knowledge or a reasonable belief that a fraudulent
insurance act is being, will be or has been committed
shall provide to the commissioner the information
required by, and in a manner prescribed by, the
commissioner. Section 6 (B) assigns the same duty
to "Any other person" although the act does not
impose upon "any other person" a mandatory duty
to report the fraudulent act.
Section 7. Immunity from Liability, states:
A. There shall be no civil liability imposed on
and no cause of action shall arise from a person's
furnishing information concerning
suspected, anticipated
or completed fraudulent insurance acts if
the information is provided to or received from:
(1) The commissioner or the commissioner's employees,
agents or representatives;
(2) Federal, state or local law enforcement or regulatory
officials or their employees, agents or representatives;
(3) A person involved in the prevention and detection
of fraudulent insurance acts or that person's agents,
employees or representatives; or
(4) The NAIC or its employees, agents or representatives.
B. Subsection A of this section shall not apply
to statements made with actual malice. [Some statutes
substitute "in good faith" rather than "actual malice."]
The italicized language of Section A may suggest that the standard
for determining whether particular conduct should be reported is
whether it is "suspicious." Indeed, the NAIC Antifraud Task Force's
2003 publication, "Guidelines for Industry Reporting Suspicious
Claims or Activity to State Fraud Bureaus" skips over the knowledge
and intent requirements of the Model Fraud Law, advising that:
A claim or activity can be deemed suspicious if
it meets standards developed by an individual, entity
or company containing or exhibiting any of the red
flags5 enumerated by
the industry or experiences of claims representatives
or other relevant insurance company personnel.
It appears that the nation's insurance regulators officially
defer to the insurance industry to define "suspicious claim or activity,"
thereby triggering a notification action that could place an innocent
claimant's name in a nationwide database of criminal suspects based
on suspicion only. In fact, the guide does not even mention a higher
standard of "reasonable suspicion" as a basis for accusing someone
of fraud.
Recall that the statute requires "knowledge" or "reasonable belief"
of a fraudulent insurance act, not mere suspicion, to trigger reporting
and immunity. "Mere suspicion" is "The imagination or apprehension
of the existence of something wrong based only on slight or no evidence,
without definite proof." Among the "red flags" of insurance fraud
are people who seem to be quite knowledgeable about the claims process
or who make in-depth inquiries about insurance before making a buying
choice.
Dilettante claims examiners, therefore, may labor under the assumption
that a former regulator who knows more about insurance claims than
other claimants or a knowledgeable consumer advocate who makes sophisticated
inquiries about coverage deserve to be reported as suspects. Close
scrutiny of the exhaustive list of "red flags" might lead one to
infer that the only sure way to avoid suspicion is to act stupid
and naïve.
Possessing knowledge or reasonable belief that one has committed
or is about to commit insurance fraud presupposes that one either
has knowledge of or has investigated with sufficient thoroughness
as to form a belief that a suspect acted or is acting knowingly
with intent to defraud. Indeed, a Pennsylvania court faced a situation
in which immunity for reporting alleged fraud stemmed from a good
faith without malice standard and concluded:
We believe the requirements of good faith and without
malice necessary to invoke the immunity requires
an insurance company to first conduct a comprehensive
investigation before accusing the insured of fraud.
Bradley v. General Accident Ins. Co.,
778 A.2d 707 (Pa. Super. 2001) Regulators might pay heed to this
opinion.
Conclusion
Fraud laws have introduced into the traditionally civil laws
regulating insurance a new force for fighting criminal activity.
While there are several reasons to embrace this new development,
there are also causes for exercising caution and reevaluating what
this change means for the balance of power between insurers and
insureds. Clearly, insurers gain advantage by the changes, a point
on which I will further elaborate in future Commentary. I will also
raise the question as to whether insurance regulatory agencies are
the proper place to house an insurance fraud function.
*Caveat:
This is the first in a series of critiques of current laws and practices
regarding insurance fraud. Aside from the references cited in the
commentaries, I base opinions expressed herein on my experiences
as former chair of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Antifraud Committee, over a decade of experience directing investigations
of fraudulent practices, and 14 years of expert testimony and consultation
in insurance litigation.
Opinions expressed in Expert Commentary articles are those of the author and are
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