Supreme Court Lowers the Bar in Proving Discrimination
July 2000
Learn the broad implications for workplace
litigation as a result of a recent decision making it easier for employees to
get their job discrimination claims before a jury.
by Paul
J. Siegel, Esq.
Jackson, Lewis,
Schnitzler & Krupman
In a June 12 decision with broad implications for workplace litigation, the
United States Supreme Court clarified the requirements for individuals attempting
to prove on-the-job discrimination. In doing so, the Court has lowered the bar
for plaintiffs in getting their federal discrimination claims before a jury
in certain jurisdictions. It is expected this decision will assume its place
with other major Supreme Court cases in defining the rights and obligations
created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the Americans With Disabilities Act.
The case, Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
involved allegations of age discrimination. However, in agreeing to review the
case, the Supreme Court considered the general conflict among the federal courts
over the kind and amount of evidence necessary to prove intentional discrimination.
This conflict was the basis for the Court's grant of review.
The implications for employers from the Reeves decision are likely to reach the range of discrimination complaints under federal
law, including age, race, sex, religion, national origin, pregnancy, and disability.
Employers must redouble their efforts to have legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons underlying all adverse employment actions, and lawyers must rethink
their strategies for defending discrimination lawsuits.
At issue in the Reeves case was the legal
procedure for parties presenting their cases to federal courts in employee lawsuits
under the federal antidiscrimination laws. Courts in every circuit have required
plaintiffs first to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. Once done, the defendants then must articulate legitimate
business reasons for their adverse employment actions. Here is where the circuits
differ: Some stated that once the defendants' reasons were shown to be a pretext,
the case went to the jury to decide whether, in fact, the employer discriminated.
Others, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which decided
the Reeves case, said that before the case went
to the jury, plaintiffs were required to prove the defendants' reasons were
a pretext plus that discrimination was the
real reason for the adverse action.
Reeves, a 57-year old supervisor with 40 years of service, was terminated
from his job at a plumbing supplies manufacturer for "numerous timekeeping errors
and misrepresentations" concerning the attendance and tardiness of employees
in his department. He subsequently sued his former employer alleging the real
reason for his termination was age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. At trial, Reeves presented evidence from which a jury ultimately
determined the employer had discriminated and awarded Reeves nearly $100,000
in damages and front pay.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the jury's award, finding Reeves'
evidence insufficient to prove unlawful discrimination. It ruled that, although
Reeves had cast sufficient doubt on the employer's stated reasons for the termination,
he had not actually shown the termination was motivated by age bias. In short,
he had not proved pretext plus.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. The High Court held that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and produces evidence that
the employer's stated reason for the action is false, a jury may conclude the
employer acted unlawfully. "In appropriate circumstances the trier of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling
to cover up a discriminatory purpose. ... Once the employer's justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth
the actual reason for its decision," the Court wrote.
A showing that the employer's stated reason is false will not always be enough
to find the employer liable, the Court noted. "It is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder
must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination," the
Court said. For instance, if the litigation conclusively revealed another, nondiscriminatory
reason for the decision, or if the plaintiff's evidence was weak in the face
of other proof that no discrimination had occurred, there would be no liability.
From a litigation defense standpoint, motions for summary judgment are likely
to be harder to win given the Court's ruling on the kind and amount of evidence
needed to show proof of an employer's discriminatory actions. If more cases
ultimately go to a jury where the employer's chances of prevailing are diminished
and the stakes are higher, there is likely to be a corresponding rise, not only
in the already explosive number of employee lawsuits and fair employment practice
agency complaints, but in the pressure to settle cases out of court-and in the
cost of doing so.
If you have any questions or would like a copy of the decision, contact Mr.
Siegel at siegelp@jacksonlewis.com or by telephone at (516) 364-0404.
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