E-mail Privacy: Does Your E-mail Take a Pit Stop?

September 2004

According to a recent federal appeals court, if your e-mail takes a temporary "pit stop" enroute to its recipient, then it may be intercepted by your Internet service provider without violating the Wiretap Act.

by Mark J. Becker, Esq., edited by Gary E. Clayton
www.privacycg.com

The case of United States v Councilman, 373 F3d 197 (1st Cir 2004), involved Interloc, Inc., an online service for rare and out-of-print book dealers, which also provided certain subscribers with an e-mail address and served as an Internet service provider (ISP). At the direction of former Interloc Vice President Bradford Councilman, an employee wrote computer code to intercept, copy, and store all incoming e-mails from Amazon.com prior to the e-mails reaching their intended recipients. Councilman and other employees read these e-mails to gain intelligence on its competitor. Consequently, Councilman was charged with violating the federal Wiretap Act.1

Communications "in Transit" versus Communications "in Storage"

The Wiretap Act, which protects the privacy of wire, oral, and electronic communications from unauthorized interception, was amended in 1986 to include "electronic communications," such as the Internet and e-mail, with the same protections from unlawful interception enjoyed by wire and oral communications. The amendments created separate legal standards for communications intercepted while "in transit" and electronic communications obtained while "in storage."

Traditionally, communications that are intercepted while in transit, such as telephone phone calls, are provided with a great deal of legal protection due to their intrusiveness and vulnerability for abuse. However, stored electronic communications, which include stored e-mails, financial transactions, medical records, and pager messages, have less legal protections. For instance, a private ISP may access and read a subscriber's e-mail messages that are stored in the user's mailbox, although it may not disclose such contents.

The government does not need to follow the procedures to obtain a wiretap order from a court, and needs only a warrant to gain access to communications in storage for the past 180 days and may use only a subpoena (no court approval needed) for data stored more than 180 days. Unlike communications intercepted in transit, the target of the investigation is not required to be notified that the government obtained his/her stored electronic communication.2

Privacy Implications

The 2–1 decision by the U.S. Court for the First Circuit concluded that because Councilman intercepted his subscribers' e-mail messages while they were in the company's temporary storage, awaiting to be delivered to their intended recipients, such conduct was not a violation of the Wiretap Act since the communication was "in storage" at the time it was intercepted. The lone dissenter, Judge Lipez, in a 36-page opinion, agreed with the government that any interception of a message between the time the sender of an e-mail presses "send" until it reaches the recipient's mailbox, even though it is temporarily stored along its journey, is subject to the Wiretap Act. This interpretation, according to the dissent, is consistent with the Congressional intent of the law and the realities of the digital age.3

The reality is that once an e-mail is sent, it is broken into different "packets," then stored for nanoseconds among a variety of computers, while the message is read and the e-mail is appropriately routed. In addition to the packets, entire e-mail messages, at certain points along the route, are also placed in temporary storage as well. These "packetized" transmissions, simultaneously "in transit" and "in storage" is a fundamental characteristic of most digital communications, and commonly referred to as "store and forward."4

Accordingly, since most digital transmissions are temporarily stored as they find their way through the network, other interceptions of digital communications, not just e-mail, will fall outside the purview of the Wiretap Act and thus receive a reduced level of privacy protection under the Councilman decision. Judge Lipez aptly notes that the "[g]overnment could install taps at telephone company switching stations to monitor phone conversations that are temporarily ‘stored' in electronic routers during transmission," without complying with the rigorous legal procedures that accompany electronic communications subject to the Wiretap Act.5

The court's potentially far-reaching interpretation has, not surprisingly, caused a great deal of concern among privacy advocates, public interest groups, and the Congress. In fact, a recent New York Times editorial analogized the logic behind the Councilman decision to permitting a postal worker to read your letters once they are in your mailbox.6

Congressional Action

Congress has already introduced two bills to address the problems raised by this decision, the "E-mail Privacy Act of 2004" (H.R. 4956) and the "E-mail Privacy Protection Act of 2004" (H.R. 4977). Both bills would subject "real-time" interceptions of electronic communications to the procedures and protections of the Wiretap Act and ensure that ISPs cannot access and use their customer's stored e-mail unless it is necessary to provide the service or the subscriber has provided consent. At the time of this writing, it is not certain as to whether either of these bills will be acted on this year.

Conclusion

A long-established maxim in the technology sector is that, in effect, "the law cannot keep up with rapid technological growth." The Councilman decision illustrates that this maxim is very much alive and that the judicial system must be cognizant of the practical effect of its decisions as they are presented with an increasing amount of cases involving complex technologies. This case is now on appeal and will hopefully be fixed either judicially or legislatively as the courts and Congress continue to interpret and refine existing laws to reflect our new digital realities.


1See "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act," Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1999).

2Councilman at 6-9, 20–28. See 18 U.S.C. 2703(a).

3Councilman at 25, 44.

4Id. at 17–18.

5Id. at 52.

6"Intercepting E-Mail," New York Times, July 2, 2004.


Mark Becker is a director with Privacy Council, Inc., the global resource for privacy and data protection services. He is an attorney with experience in the areas of privacy, telecommunications, and government. Prior to joining Privacy Council, Inc., Mr. Becker served as the privacy officer for Arbitron Inc., was a director of regulatory affairs for e.spire Communications, and worked as an attorney for the Federal Communications Commission. He received his JD from Touro Law School in Huntington, New York, and his BS from Syracuse University's Newhouse School of Public Communications in Syracuse, New York. Mr. Becker can be reached by e-mail at mark.becker@privacycouncil.com.


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